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ARGUMENT
THE GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY ACT REQUIRES THAT THE STATE
SHOW MORE THAN BUT-FOR CAUSATION TO RETAIN IMMUNITY
FROM LIABILITY.
Before examining the State's arguments, it is important to
note what the State does not argue in its brief. The State does
not dispute Plaintiffs' contention that their interpretation of
"arises out of" as a but-for test provides no meaningful limit
to the exceptions from waiver in the Government Immunity Act,
therefore creating an unworkable test (Pis. Br. at 14-15). The
State does not dispute that "arises out of" is not viewed as
but-for causation in the rest of the Utah Code (Pis. Br. at 15).
The State does not dispute that Plaintiffs' interpretation is
conceptually coherent; provides limits, and is more in line with
the policy goals of the Act. Instead, the thrust of the State's
argument is that, notwithstanding the general superiority of
Plaintiffs' approach, the plain language rule and stare decisis
demand that this Court endorse the State's interpretation of
"arises out of" as only requiring only a but-for causal link
between the injury and one of the exceptions to the general
waiver of immunity in the Act. This argument is fundamentally
incorrect. The State's interpretation is not endorsed by the
plain language of the phrase "arises out of." The State's
interpretation does not have stare decisis force, and even if it
does, there is sufficient reason to overturn the precedent.

1

A.

Plaintiffs'
"integrally
related'' test is the best
way to determine whether an injury arises out of
a condition or activity
that is excepted from
liability
under the Act.

As explained in Plaintiffs' opening brief, the "integrally
related" test put forth by Plaintiffs is the best way to
determine whether an injury arises out of one of the conditions
or activities listed in subsection (5) of the Act, The first
reason for this is that the alternate but-for test provides no
clear limits to cut off the application of the exceptions listed
in subsection (5) and is therefore conceptually incoherent as a
test. Because the only limit for a but-for test is whether an
excepted activity or condition was somewhere within the neverending chain of events, the exceptions overcome the basic policy
of the Governmental Immunity Act: to allow individuals to
recover damages caused by the negligent acts or omissions of the
State and municipal governments. The State does not respond to
this argument.
The second reason for preferring Plaintiffs' interpretation
is that the "integrally related" test is consistent with the
other parts of the Utah Code and so is more likely to be the
interpretation intended by the Legislature. The State argues
that the plain language of the statute supports its
interpretation, but this view is incorrect, as will be explained
in Part B of this brief.

2

Yet another reason to prefer Plaintiffs' interpretation is
that the but-for interpretation would mean that property seized
for forfeiture purposes is subject to an ordinary duty of care,
while property seized for evidentiary purposes is not subject to
any duty of care. This is an inconsistent and absurd result. The
State responds to this on page 11 of its brief, but
misunderstands Plaintiffs' argument: the but-for test does not
nullify the forfeiture statutes; however, the but-for test
creates wildly different standards of care for property seized
for different purposes without a rational basis for
distinguishing between the two. The State fails to articulate a
basis as to why the Legislature might think that property held
by the State for civil or criminal forfeiture proceedings1 should
be subject to an ordinary standard of care, while property held
for evidentiary purposes should not be subject to any standard
of care whatsoever. Plaintiffs can think of none. Absent a
showing that the Legislature intended this result, the but-for
interpretation leads to absurd results and so should be rejected
by this Court.

1.

Contrary to the State's assertions, Title 2 4 applies

to both civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings. Utah Code
Ann. § 24-1-2 (1) .

3

Finally, this Court should prefer Plaintiffs'
interpretation because the but-for test excuses total
indifference on the part of government officials in caring for
property of private citizens, including live animals. Though the
State argues that the willful conduct of government officials is
not immune from suit and that a § 1983 suit is an available
remedy for violations of an individual's constitutional rights,2
that misses the point. Endorsing the but-for test sends a
message to government officials that they will not be held
accountable for any damage to property in their possession so
long as they do not intentionally destroy or damage the
property. To read the law this way would be to "cloak the
ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity in modern garb." Johnson
v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 2006 UT 15, 1 19, 133 P.3d 402.
Moreover, the practical effect of this ruling is easy to
predict: when the incentive to care for an item decreases, a
person will be less inclined to expend effort in taking care of
that item. If the Court holds that government officials are
immune from suit for negligent handling of items in their care
if not held for forfeiture, then government officials have less
of an incentive to take care of items in their possession. In

2.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create a cause of action for

negligence. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986).

4

short, Plaintiffs7 interpretation preserves the accountability
function of the Governmental Immunity Act and so this Court
should prefer it to the State's but-for interpretation.

B.

The plain language of the statutory
text does not
support the State's
interpretation
of "arises out
of" as only requiring a showing of
but-for
causation.

In pages 9-13 of its brief, the State makes the argument
that the plain language of the statutory text supports their
interpretation. Utah appellate courts have long held that "in
construing any statute, we first examine the statute's plain
language and resort to other methods of statutory interpretation
only if the language is ambiguous." Gull Laboratories v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 936 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Utah App. 1997). If
the term to be interpreted is not defined in the statute itself,
the Court should rely on the dictionary to decide the usual
meaning of the term. Id.
In this case, both parties agree that the issuance of the
search warrant was a "judicial proceeding." The lower court
relied on only the issuance of the search warrant as the basis
for its ruling. The term to be interpreted is therefore "arises
out of." This phrase is not defined in the statute itself, and
the State provides no dictionary definition of the phrase.
Plaintiffs have not found any dictionary definitions of the
phrase in its entirety. The State's argument also seems to

5

contradict the many times that this Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals have relied on interpretive methods to divine the
meaning of this term. See, e.g., Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford
Insurance, 2004 UT 104, ?SI 10-11, 106 P.3d 700; Viking Insurance
Co. v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661, 664-65 (Utah App. 1996); Taylor v.
Ogden City School District, 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1996);
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 888 P.2d 707, 712
(Utah App. 1994); National Farmers Union Property & Casualty v.
Western Casualty & Surety, 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978). Prior
cases make clear that the phrase "arises out of" is a legal term
of art and not a term that has a plain meaning apart from case
law. As explained in Plaintiffs' opening brief, Plaintiffs'
interpretation of the phrase "arises out of" is more consistent
with prior case law, and so should be preferred over the State's
interpretation.
The State also argues in the conclusion of its plain
language argument that "when the facts are looked at in their
entirety and when giving effect to each term in Section [63-30d301(5) (e)], Plaintiffs' claimed injury plainly ^arose out o f
the institution and prosecution of the judicial proceedings
against Plaintiff Ryan Hoyer." Br. of State at 13. This
conclusion is conceptually incoherent and only serves to confuse
the issue. First, the lower court limited the operative judicial
proceeding to the issuance of the search warrant. The State's

6

reference to some sort of other event that would have
constituted a judicial proceeding was not decided upon below-the
Court only found the cause of the damages arose from the search
warrant: "but for the seizure of the snakes, plaintiffs would
not have suffered any damages." (R. at 382). Second, The basis
of Plaintiffs' appeal is the proper interpretation of "arises
out of": if the phrase only requires a showing that but for the
issuance of the search warrant, Plaintiffs' injury would not
have occurred, then the lower court decided correctly. If, as
the Plaintiffs suggest, the phrase requires more than that, then
the Court should remand for the district court to apply the
proper legal standard. The State's conclusion quoted above
ignores the interpretive question entirely in favor of an
intuitive, vague, "I know it when I see it"3 kind of test. With
apologies to Justice Stewart, a clear interpretation of "arises
out of" is needed for uniform application of the law and to
reduce, rather than increase, litigation.
However, it is possible that what the State meant in the
quoted statement is that it would prevail under Plaintiffs'
standard. The State does not analyze Plaintiffs' interpretation
to argue why this is the case, and this would be unlikely given

3.

See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)

(Stewart, J., concurring).

7

the paucity of the findings in the lower court and the factbound nature of the "'integrally related" test.4 Regardless of the
findings of the lower court, there are facts that would be
relevant under the Plaintiffs' standard that have not yet been
reviewed by the district court.

C.

The court is not bound to accept the
interpretation
under the doctrine of
decisis.

State's
stare

4.

The only finding that might support this argument

would be that "the snakes were used as evidence against
plaintiff Ryan Hoyer in both Davis County Justice Court and
Clearfield City Justice Court." (R. at 382). As Plaintiffs have
said in their previous brief, this finding is untrue, and was
consistently denied by the Plaintiffs. It is a matter of public
record that only the photographs of the snakes were entered into
evidence. The State does not dispute this in footnote 3 of its
brief. There was no evidence for this finding but only the
State's assertion that this was an uncontested fact. Since this
finding was not relevant for purposes of the State's motion or
the lower court's order, this Court should not consider this
finding, but rather remand the case to the district court to
determine if the snakes were actually used as evidence along
with instructions for the lower court to apply the correct
standard.

8

On pages 14-17 of its brief, the State argues that stare
decisis compels this Court to apply the but-for standard in
determining the interpretation of "arises out of.7' The passage
the State claims has stare decisis effect is from Taylor: u But
for the assault, Zachary's injuries would not have occurred."
927 P.2d at 163. Plaintiffs have two responses to this argument:
first, this statement is dicta and has no binding weight under
the principles of stare decisis. Second, even if this quotation
carries the weight of stare decisis, there is good cause for
this court to overturn that precedent.
The quoted passage from Taylor is not binding authority; it
is merely dicta. Obiter

dicta

(or just dicta) is "[a] judicial

comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that
is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
precedential." Black's Law Dictionary 1102 (8th ed. 2004). A
passage in a judicial opinion is dicta if it was not an issue
that was raised and briefed by the parties. 20 Am. Jur. 2d
Courts § 134 (2005).
As explained in Note 3 of Plaintiffs' opening brief, the
issue of the scope of the phrase "arises out of" has not been
raised or briefed by the parties on previous cases. Indeed, the
degree of separation both in time and physical location between
the injury and the act that the State relies upon for immunity
is unprecedented for a case of this type. Because this Court has

9

never had the opportunity to interpret "arises out of" beyond
ruling that it meant something broader than proximate causation,
this Court should not feel bound by a simple mention of but-for
causation in previous decisions.
Also, as noted on page 20 of Plaintiffs' brief, but-for
causation has not been a necessary element of previous cases
decided by this Court. Previous cases would not have had a
different result under Plaintiffs' standard than under a but-for
standard. This not only shows that but-for causation was not a
necessary part of the decision; it also shows that the Court has
not had the necessity of considering the question presented by
the Court in this case. Because of these reasons, the passage
relied upon by the State is dicta and the Court should not give
the passage stare decisis authority.
But even if the Court decides that the passage relied upon
by the State constitutes binding precedent, this does not end
the inquiry. "Stare decisis is not an inexorable command;
rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula
of adherence to the latest decision." Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 828 (1991). Therefore, when the Court is "clearly
convinced that a rule was originally erroneous or is no longer
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than
harm will come by departing from precedent" it is justified in
overturning that precedent. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399

10

(Utah 1994); See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v, Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (items to
consider in over ruling precedent include: workablility, the
effect of the overturning of the precedent on those who rely
upon it, whether the legal framework the precedent was based on
has developed in such a way as to make the precedent an
anachronism, and whether the factual framework of the precedent
has changed to the extent that reliance on the precedent would
be unjustifiable). To the extent that the but-for standard
constitutes precedent, this Court should abandon that precedent
and adopt Plaintiffs' standard.
Even if the court concludes that the but-for standard has
some precedential basis, it should abandon the but-for standard
because it was erroneous in the first instance and unworkable in
the present. As shown in pages 13-15 of Plaintiffs' opening
brief, a but-for test does not work to limit the scope of the
exceptions listed in the Act. A but-for test would explode the
exceptions in the Act to the point that they would overwhelm the
general waiver of liability. A causation standard that does not
limit causation in any meaningful way is per

se incorrect and

fails as a workable standard to judge causation.
Also, the fact pattern of the present case is so far
removed from previous cases that it would be unjustifiable to
rely on the precedent from those cases. In previous cases, the

11

injury was suffered in the same location and at about the same
time as the excepted activity or condition. There was no
question as to the remoteness of the exception. There was also
no briefing by the parties about the question of remoteness. In
the present case, the injury took place well after the issuance
of the search warrant, and far removed from the point of the
warrant's issuance or execution. Because the facts are so
different from those used in concluding that but-for causation
was appropriate in the former cases, a re-examination of this
standard is appropriate.
Furthermore, the law relied upon in articulating the
interpretation for "arises out of" has been refined. As
explained in pages 17-19 of Plaintiffs' opening brief, case law
regarding the interpretation for "arises out of" has developed
substantially since the interpretation in National Farmers that
was subsequently relied upon by the Court in Taylor. Subsequent
case law has shown the flaws of using but-for causation as a
standard, and state courts have moved the law forward on a more
equitable basis. The Court should be responsive to these
developments and take the opportunity to refine the law in this
context.
Also, applying the but-for standard leads to results that
are counter to good public policy, as explained on pages 15 and
16 of Plaintiffs' opening brief and in part A of this brief. The

12

Court's continued endorsement of the but-for test would send a
signal to government officials that they have no duty of care
for property held as evidence. The consequences of such a signal
must be considered by this Court in determining the standard
that it will endorse.
The countervailing interest of the State in preserving any
potential precedents is slight. While overturning precedent
necessarily prejudices the interest of those who have relied on
the prior interpretation of the law, it would be difficult for
the State to show such an interest in this case. This interest
is at its highest in interpreting contract law, where parties
negotiate in good faith and rely upon the stable meaning of the
terms that they have chosen in planning a deliberate course of
action. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828. In this case, the State has no
reliance interest when the immunity is only for acts that are
not intentional. In other words, the State cannot claim a
reliance interest in the standard governing an accident. The
State's interest in retaining precedent is therefore marginal to
nonexistent.
Finally, while it is true that it is usually left to the
Legislature to overturn existing statutory interpretation, this
Court has departed from previous interpretations of statutes
upon good cause. Hackford v. Utah Power & Light, 740 P.2d 1281,
1283 (Utah 1987) . The question for determining whether existing

13

statutory interpretation is so settled that it has become "has
been woven into the fabric of the law." Id. at 1285. The
interpretation in question has not achieved such status. As
mentioned earlier, there are no decisions interpreting "arises
out of" that have implicated the but-for test. This means that
the Legislature has not relied upon such cases when considering
whether revision was necessary. Also, this means that the
Legislature has not relied on the stability of that decision in
developing the surrounding statutory scheme. Finally, it is
doubtful that previous cases have put the Legislature on notice
of the potential problems with the but-for test. Therefore,
their failure to act should not be viewed as deliberate
inaction.
The State's argument for stare decisis fails, both because
the passage that it relies upon is dicta, and because there is
good cause to overturn precedent in this case. The Court should
adopt Plaintiffs' interpretation of "arises out of" in its
interpretation of the Government Immunity Act.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' "integrally related" test is the best way to
determine whether an injury arises out of an excepted activity
or condition under the Governmental Immunity Act. This test is
in line with the intent of the Legislature in passing the Act,
is consistent with prior precedent, and is not foreclosed by

14

stare decisis. This Court should reverse the decision of the
lower court and remand for further proceedings consistent with
the correct legal standard.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22d day of August, 2008.

iL

Jathan Whittaker
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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